
Op-Ed
How the Manosphere Reaches Teenage Boys
Most boys who have heard of Andrew Tate don’t view him positively. Exposure may matter more than fandom.
- Written by
- Zander Deutch
- Last updated
- This is for
- Allies & Partners
This summer, I interned at Lean In, researching the manosphere’s influence on teenage boys.
Key numbers
- 19% of UK boys aged 9 to 16 who have heard of Andrew Tate view him positively. 31% are neutral.
- 26 minutes: how long it took for manosphere content to be recommended to every test account.
- 13% of boys who feel neutral about Tate reject the claim that misogyny’s prevalence is exaggerated.
- 84% to 72%: US 8th and 10th graders who agree women should have the same job opportunities as men, 2018 to 2023.
This summer, I interned at Lean In, researching the manosphere's influence on teenage boys.
I’d started to see my peers get sucked into the manosphere – the content was flooding their feeds and rewiring their thinking in alarming ways. I wanted to dig into how this content reaches boys like me, and how it influences our view of the world at such a malleable age.
Over the last five years, much public attention has focused on boys and men who actively support the manosphere, which includes people like Andrew Tate, Myron Gaines, and Sneako. These influencers draw massive audiences by promoting deeply misogynistic worldviews. But as I dug into the research, I became interested in a much larger group: teenage boys who don't particularly like the manosphere, but still encounter its content.
How does manosphere content reach teenage boys?
As an example, only 19% of boys aged 9 to 16 in the UK who have heard of Andrew Tate have a positive opinion of him. Another 31% said they were neutral. The middle swath may be larger than Tate’s fan base partly because manosphere content is hard for teenage boys to avoid. When researchers set up YouTube Shorts accounts on ten blank phones registered as 16- to 18-year-old boys, manosphere content was recommended to every account within 26 minutes, regardless of whether the account searched for male-centric terms or for general male-interest topics such as gym tips and comedy.
This kind of unplanned exposure complicates how we understand the manosphere's influence. Its success may not depend on turning boys into committed followers and persuading them to hate women, but instead on feeding them content that makes them less sure that misogyny is widespread, serious, or worth confronting.
We may be able to see this happening among boys who feel neutral about Tate. This neutral group is just as likely as Tate’s fans to downplay misogyny: Only 13% of them reject the claim that misogyny’s prevalence is exaggerated.
Why does perceived consensus matter?
That matters as a signal of what boys think is normal. Research on misperceived social norms indicates that people routinely assume their peers hold more traditional views than they do. Many people’s personal views on gender roles are more progressive than what they believe “most people” in their country think. For example, nearly three-quarters of adults say housework should be shared equally, but only about half think most people in their country agree.
In other words, many people's sense of "what everyone thinks" is already skewed conservative before any influencer enters the picture. The manosphere may reinforce this by providing a louder input — a vivid, repeated signal of what men supposedly think. This signal may lead young men to believe that society expects far more rigid masculinity than they personally endorse. If neutral boys overestimate how much their peers share Tate's views, they might become unwilling to speak up against misogyny out of fear of being alone.
Are boys’ attitudes towards gender quality changing?
Whether that shift in perception eventually changes what boys privately believe is harder to say. Our longest American record is not reassuring. David Waldron's analysis of Monitoring the Future, which has surveyed 8th and 10th graders since 1991, finds boys’ agreement that women should have the same job opportunities as men falling from 84% in 2018 to 72% in 2023 — on a measure that had barely moved in the previous three decades.
The implications are important. If the manosphere’s effect on boys travels through exposure and perceived consensus, then studies asking whether boys endorse extreme views are likely to miss it. Researchers need to capture shifting norm perception among young men, not just manosphere consumption and affinity.
The data can’t tell us which came first: whether the content makes boys doubtful, or whether doubtful boys seek out the content. Either way, young men may be calibrating their sense of "what men think" from the loudest voices rather than the most common ones.
